Recently Sarkar (DCC 2014) has proposed a new attack on small decryption exponent when RSA Modulus is of the form N = p r q for r ≥ 2. This variant is known as Prime Power RSA. The work of Sarkar improves the result of May (PKC 2004) when r ≤ 5. In this paper, we improve the existing results for r = 3, 4. We also study partial key exposure attack on Prime Power RSA. Our result improves the work of May (PKC 2004) for certain parameters.
Introduction
In the domain of public key cryptography, RSA has been the most popular cipher since its inception in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. Wiener [19] presented an important result on RSA by showing that one can factor N in polynomial time if the decryption exponent d < . Later using the idea of Coppersmith [6] , Boneh and Durfee [4] improved this bound up to d < N 0.292 . There are several RSA variants proposed in the literature for efficiency and security point of view. In this paper, we consider Prime Power RSA, where RSA modulus N is of the form N = p r q where r ≥ 2. The modulus N = p 2 q was first used by Fujioka et al. in Eurocrypt 1991 [8] . In Eurocrypt 1998, Okamoto et al. [16] also used N = p 2 q to design a public key crypto system. There are two variants of Prime Power RSA. In the first variant ed ≡ 1 mod p r−1 (p − 1)(q − 1), where as in the second variant ed ≡ 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). In [9] , authors proved that polynomial time factorization is possible for the
r+1 . For the first variant, Takagi in Crypto 1998 [18] proved that when d ≤ N . Recently Lu et al. [14] improve the work of [15] . They show one can factor N when d < N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 . Sarkar [17] has considered the polynomial f e (x, y, z) = 1 + x(N − y r − y r−1 z + y r−1 ) over Z e whose root is (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = (b, p, q), where ed = 1 + bφ(N ) to analyse the RSA modulus N = p r q. In this paper we consider the same polynomial. But our lattice construction to solve this polynomial is different from [17] . As a result, we improve the existing works of [15, 17, 14] when r = 3, 4.
Partial Exposure on d. In Crypto 1996, Kocher [10] first proposed a novel attack which is known as partial key exposure attack. He showed that an attacker can get a few bits of d by timing characteristic of an RSA implementing device. Fault attacks [3] and power analysis [11] are other important side channel attacks in this direction. Boneh, Durfee and Frunkel [2] first proposed polynomial time algorithms when the attacker knows a few bits of the decryption exponent. The approach of [2] [7] .
May in PKC 2004 [15] studied partial key exposure attack on Prime Power RSA. He showed that one can factor N in polynomial time from the knowledge
when RSA modulus N = p r q. Lu et al. [14] improve the work of [15] and show that factorization of N can be possible when |d − d 0 | < N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 . So in particular, when r = 2, approach of [15, 14] works when |d − d 0 | < N 0.22 . We have improved this bound up to N 0.33 . Unfortunately, our method works only when d < N 0.67 . Our strategy to solve multivariate modular equation is based on lattice reduction [12] followed by Gröbner basis technique. Although our technique works in practice as noted from the experiments we perform, we need heuristic assumption for theoretical results. Assumption 1. Our lattice-based construction yields algebraically independent polynomials. The common roots of these polynomials can be efficiently computed by using techniques like calculation of the resultants or finding a Gröbner basis.
Small Decryption Exponent Attack on Prime Power RSA
In this section we will consider the case when RSA modulus is of the form N = p r q where r ≥ 2. Proof. We have ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N ) where N = p r q. So we can write ed = 1 + b(N − p r − p r−1 q + p r−1 ). Now we want to find the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = (b, p, q) modulo e of the polynomial
. Clearly, (X, Y, Z) provides the upper bounds of the elements in the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ), neglecting any small constant. Note that y r 0 z 0 = N . Now we define a set of polynomials which will be used to construct a lattice.
For integers m, a, t ≥ 0, we consider the following polynomials
We replace each occurence of the monomial y r z in g i,j,k by N . Let the new polynomial be h i,j,k . Now we want to make the coefficient of the monomial x i+j y k+(r−1)i+rj−rl z i+a−l in h i,j,k to be 1, where l = min
Let A be its coefficient in h i,j,k . Assume gcd(A, e) = 1. Let AB ≡ 1 mod e m . Now consider the set of polynomials
Similarly construct h i,j,0 (x, y, z) = Bh i,j,0 (x, y, z)e m−i . Next, we form a lattice L by taking the coefficient vectors of the shift polynomials h i,j,k (xX, yY, zZ) as basis. 
. During the calculations of s y , we assume either m > a or a − t r < m < a. Now
Assuming m ≥ a − t r , we have
One gets the root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) using lattice reduction over L, if det(L) < e mw . Let a = τ 1 m and t = τ 2 m, where τ 1 , τ 2 are non-negative real numbers. Now putting the values of det(L) and w in the condition det(L) < e mw , we need
For a fixed δ, we will take the partial derivative of η with respect to τ 1 , τ 2 and equate each of them to 0, we get τ 1 = − Exact expression of τ (r) in Theorem 1 is very complicated. Hence in Table 1 , we present a few values of τ (r) for different values of r. One can note that from Table 1 , our method will be better than the existing works for r = 3, 4. Also in Table 2 , we present a few numerical values of δ for different values of r, m, a, t.
When r > 4, the existing result is better than our approach. However, Boneh et al. in Crypto 1999 [5] proved that a fraction of 1 r+1 fraction of bits of MSBs of p are sufficient for polynomial time factorization. Also for large r, Elliptic Method Factorization [13] will be efficient because size of primes would be reduced for larger values of r. Hence for all practical purpose value of r can not be large. Experimental Results. We have implemented the code in SAGE 5.12 on a Linux Mint 12. The hardware platform is HP Compaq 6200 Pro MT PC with a 3.4 Ghz Inter(R) Core i7-2600 CPU. Gröbner basis always contains a polynomial of the form y − p. Hence we can always extract the root successfully. We present the experimental results for the following cases: r = 3 and δ is in the range 0.270 to 0.341; r = 4 and δ = 0.362.
Remark 1.
Experimental results presented in [17] are up to δ = 0.27. In particular, when δ = 0.27, the lattice constructed in [17] is of dimension 220 when r = 3. From the above table we can see that the dimension of the lattice in this construction is 102 when r = 3 and δ = 0.27. 
Partial Key Exposure Attack on Prime Power RSA
We will start with the following lemma. Our proof is similar to [1] . 
Hence the result.
So from an approximation of d, one can find an approximation of b. We will use this idea to prove the following result. 
To find (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) using lattice reduction over L, we need det(L) < e mw . Let a = τ 1 m and t = τ 2 m, where τ 1 , τ 2 are non-negative real numbers. Now putting the values of det(L) and w in the condition det(L) < e mw , required condition is
For a fixed δ, we will take the partial derivative of η with respect to τ 1 , τ 2 and equate each of them to 0, we get τ 1 = − .
In Table 4 Note that cryptanalysis using our method is possible if λ <
, we have β < . In [15] , it is proved that if |d − d 0 | < N β where β = max (r+1) 2 . Approach of [15, 14] works even when d is of order N . However our approach does not work in these cases.
In Table 5 , we have compared our bounds with the work of [14] . From Table 5 , it is clear that when δ < , our approach is better than the work of [14] if r < 5. We could not attempt experiments as the lattice dimension is becoming quite high to show the improvements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the Prime Power RSA, i.e, when RSA modulus is of the form N = p r q. Our new lattice construction improves the existing attacks for small decryption exponent when r = 3, 4. We also have studied partial key exposure attack on Prime Power RSA. Our new approach improves the existing works when 2 ≤ r ≤ 4 if d < N .
